Journal of Law and Health
Volume 31

Issue 1

Article

5-1-2018

A Leap to Hybrid Governance for European Union Healthcare on
Organ Donations
Tasnim Ahmed
Liverpool John Moores University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, Cells Commons, Health Law and Policy
Commons, and the Tissues Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Tasnim Ahmed, A Leap to Hybrid Governance for European Union Healthcare on Organ Donations, 31 J.L.
& Health 118 (2018)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh/vol31/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

AHMED, A LEAP TO HYBRID GOVERNANCE FOR EUROPEAN UNION
HEALTHCARE ON ORGAN DONATIONS

A LEAP TO HYBRID GOVERNANCE FOR
EUROPEAN UNION HEALTHCARE ON ORGAN
DONATIONS
DR TASNIM AHMED
LECTURER, LIVERPOOL JOHN MOORES UNIVERSITY

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 119
II. EU GOVERNANCE IN ORGANS ..................................................... 120
III. ACTION PLAN (2009-2015) AND ORGANS DIRECTIVE................ 130
IV. IS NEW GOVERNANCE THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD IN THE ORGANS
CASE? .................................................................................. 133
V. HYBRID FORM OF REGULATION AND THE CASE OF THE ORGANS ......
DIRECTIVE ........................................................................... 135
VI. PROPOSAL OF THE INTEGRATED MODEL: A FUSION OF THE THREE .
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES................................................. 141
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 143

118

AHMED, A LEAP TO HYBRID GOVERNANCE FOR EUROPEAN UNION
HEALTHCARE ON ORGAN DONATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the use of ‘soft law’ has extended the boundaries of
European Union (EU) involvement in healthcare, thereby pushing the
Europeanization process to involve learning and adoption rather than institutionbuilding. Radaelli describes the process as “generating indirect pressures for
adaption at national level via non-binding instruments”.1 However, the problem with
soft law is that there are significant variations in its outcomes. This seems to produce
better results in areas where actors share similar objectives, best practices are easily
practiced and cultural sensitivities are low. Hence, this article asserts that soft law on
its own merits may not be sufficient for Europeanization and that an element of hard
law is required to ensure optimum outcomes. Therefore, the best solution would be
to apply a hybrid model. The existence of soft law as the only mechanism for law
making in the field of EU healthcare is fairly unlikely. Nevertheless, Hervey notes
that “law and soft modes of health governance are becoming increasingly
interwoven, thereby opening the door for hybrid EU policy instruments”.2
Accordingly, this article will evaluate two proposals that the Organs
Directive along with the Commission’s Action Plan 2009-2015 can be viewed as a
form of hybrid governance. 3 The Organs Directive is the first legally binding
supranational risk regulation devised in the field of organ donation and
transplantation. The Directive is modelled on the earlier Directive dealing with
blood, tissue and cells. The Action Plan, which is soft law, will complement the
Directive. The Directive and Action Plan requires additional administration
procedures from the Member States with the EU Commission regularly monitoring
the implementation of the work programme to ensure it is manageable for them.
Before probing the Directive, the Impact Assessment (IA) undertaken by
the EU Commission on organ donations, used to determine the rationale behind the
adoption of the stringent Directive with the Action Plan, will be examined. The
social, economic and health impacts of the four regulatory options available to the
Commission will be considered. The Directive and the Action Plan, which are finally
adopted, will be discussed in detail, before the arguments are placed highlighting the
fact that the Directive and Action Plan display a mode of hybrid governance. Next,
the advantages and disadvantages of hybrid governance will be laid out and
conclusions will be drawn to whether the hybrid model was the best form of action
in EU healthcare. Lastly, in conclusion, the article will propose the emergence of an

1

See generally Claudi M. Radaelli, The OMC: A New Governance
Architecture for the EU? Swedish Institute for Policy Studies 1 (2003).
2

Tamara Hervey & Bart Vanhercke, Healthcare and the EU: the law and
policy patchwork, 2 Cambridge University Press 84, 87 (2010).
3

European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Commission
Implementing Directive 2012/25/EU laying down information between
member states of human organs intended for transplantation, 9 October
2012, 275 Official Journal of the European Union 27 (2012).

120

CLEVELAND-MARSHALL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

(Vol. 31:1)

“integrated model” within the Organs Directive. This is based on the fusion of the
three governance structures, namely the OMC, comitology and agencies.
II. EU GOVERNANCE IN ORGANS
The EU has competence to legislate in the area of organ transplantation.
Notably, Article 168(4) (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TEFU”) has empowered the Community to take “Measures setting high standards
of quality and safety of organs and substances of human origin blood and blood
derivatives.”4 In accordance with Article 168(7) TFEU: ‘The measures referred to in
paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national provisions on the donation or medical use of
organs and blood’.5
The term ‘national provisions’ highlights the differences in the national
legal approaches to concerning donor consent. The term ‘medical use’ refers to
organ donations for transplantation.6 The sub Article stating ‘The responsibilities of
the Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care
and the allocation of the resources assigned to them’ highlights the special status of
organ transplantation.7
The EU Commission justified European-wide action by pointing out that
unified European action would result in European-wide diversity. The EU
Commission claimed the advantages of Union action as follows: The EU facilitation
of consensus-building allowing quicker implementation: economies of scale, lower
transition costs in establishing the New Quality and Safety system and reduced
running costs; greater fairness and contribution to solidarity; enhanced donor and
recipient confidence stemming from legal clarity. 8
However, it is noted that the requirement for a similar quality and safety
regime from each EU Member State may require various adjustments to be
successful at the local hospital level. On the positive side, it would ensure that it if
quality and standards are standardized at the European level, then it would guarantee
equal access for all European citizens. The EU Commission’s first publication
looked at the policy options and set objectives to promote enhanced coordination
between Member States.9 Here, the EU Commission highlighted that the Community
needed to react under Article 168(4) (a) TFEU to deal with the challenges facing
organ transplantation: The transfer of organs can lead to transmission of diseases
4

See European Commission, Communication From the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council Organ Donation and Transplantation:
Policy actions at EU level, (May 30, 2007).
5

Id. at 2.

6

Id. at 3.

7

Id. at 5.

8

Id. at 10.

9

Id. at 6.
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such as Hepatitis B and C, HIV, various parasites and cancer. Although, there are a
number of cross-border treatments the legal quality and safety requirements differ
between Member States. Thus there was a need for the system to a standardisation of
the system to ensure patients are being protected throughout Europe. 10 The EU
Commission urged that measures needed to be introduced throughout the procedure
to improve the quality and safety of organs, from pre-transplant evaluation
procedures set for donors, to setting procedures for procurement and requirements
for organ preservation and transport.11 A system needed to be in place, which
allowed donors to be traced in case of complications. National authorities were also
encouraged to take active roles and establish authorized centres in Europe that would
monitor safety and quality criteria. The EU Commission concluded that it would
‘define the precise, balanced scope of the EU legal framework on quality and safety
for human organs taking in account the dialogue it has had so far with the Member
States on the issues’.12
Due to a shortage of donors, the Commission suggested that the EU
Member States may be able to create a system by which donors could be identified,
as after their death donors are lost due to lack of referral, or because the option was
not presented to their relations.13 If healthcare professionals were trained to identify
potential donors, donor rates could be increased. Moreover, providing information to
the healthcare professionals on transplantation may affect the donors’ willingness to
donate. Eighty-one per cent of Europeans agreed that the use of a donor card would
facilitate organ donations after their death.14 Given the need to establish adequate
national transplant systems; good organisational and technical support is essential.15
The document stated that a “flexible system combining a decentralized network
formed by local organisations mainly focused on organ procurement, and the
promotion of donation with large organisations focused on promoting organ sharing
and cooperation seems to be the most effective organisational approach”.16 This
10

Id. at 7.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 8.

13

Id. at 9.

14

C. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of
Experimentalist Governances is the European Union. LAFOLLETTE
SCHOOL WORKING PAPER 1 (2006).
15

16

Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (Mar. 23, 2000).

Commission Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a
Directive on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for
Transplantation and Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation at
8. COM (2009-2015); See Strengthened Cooperation between Member
States: Impact Assessment, SEC (2008) at 2956.
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would give rise to the formation of networks and experimental governance, as
experimentalist tools such as open consultations would be utilized to achieve the
goals of promoting organ donation.
The EU Commission emphasized the need to share best practices among the
Member States to increase the number of donors and educate health care
professionals. It would also encourage action at the EU level for the interchange of
organs between national levels.17 The EU Commission also proposed an Action Plan
that would include qualitative, and quantative indicators, and regular reporting in
order to promote greater coordination. It restated the preference for the use of the
OMC type methodology utilising the Directly Deliberative Polyarchy theory (so
called DDP theory) and signalled the shift away from the traditional command and
control mechanisms of governance used in blood and to a lesser extent, in tissues
and cells regulation.18 Thereafter the EU Commission conducted a series of meetings
with stakeholders and experts to receive feedback on the proposed Action Plan, as
well as input on the drafting of the proposal for a Directive in this area. The adoption
of the OMC within this area raised issues with certain stakeholders, who felt that this
method would divert personnel and resources away from the actual strategies and
thus was unnecessary. 19 It was also felt that there was a greater need for flexibility to

Commission of the European Parliament and the Council:” Organ
donation and transplantation: policy actions at the EU level - Summary of
the Impact Assessment. SEC (2007) 704; Commission of The European
Communities for a Strategy for Europe on Nutrition. Overweight and Obesity
related health issues. COM (2007) 279 final (May 30, 2007); See supra note
4.
17

18

C. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: Experimentalist
Governance in the European Union 2, Oxford Univ. Press (2010). The
theory of (directly deliberative polyarchy (DDP) emphasises direct
participation, deliberation and concrete problem solving. Sabel and Zeitlin
argue that the OMC expresses the essence of DDP. It is directly deliberative
because allows actors with direct field experience to bring about different
reactions and open new possibilities. It is polyarchic, because it is a system,
which allows local units to learn discipline and set goals for each other.
19

Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying Document to the
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council Organ Donation and Transplantation: Policy Actions at EU Level
Impact Assessment. SEC (2007) (May 30, 2007). The Open Method of
Coordination (OMC) was defined by the Portuguese Presidency at Lisbon,
and afterwards in terms closely modelled on the European Employment
Strategy as involving a specific ensemble of elements: Fixing guidelines for
the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals that they
set in the short, medium and long term; Establishing, where appropriate,
quantative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the
world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a
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be built into any EU regulation regime. This meant that clinicians and patients
needed to be granted adequate freedoms to make decisions about associated risks of
the use organ transplantation, given factors such as waiting lists and organ
shortage.20
In reaction to stakeholders’ participation in organ donation and
transplantation policies, DG Sanco launched an open consultation in 2006. The
Commission received 73 contributions from regulators, medical and patient
organisations and created a key stakeholder group from around 16 European
Associations.21 The group met in 2008 and shared information, which was then
incorporated within the definitions of the policy options. The EU Commission since
2007 has held various meetings with national experts of all Member States,
including Eurotransplant and Scandiatransplant, and discussed key priorities.22
Arguably, the EU Commission’s interactions with the stakeholders and
experts for feedback, along with its efforts to bring together the actors to reflect on
the current issues of organ donations and develop legislation through networks,
highlighted Zeitlin’s network deliberative decision-making concept.23 The theory
purports a shift away from the ideals of representative democracy in which laws are
only perceived to be legitimate if the electorate formulates them. Informal
deliberation is not conceived from the technical elites but rather through a multitude
of actors. This was particularly true as at this stage options for regulation were
considered but it was not necessarily assumed at the outset that hard law would be
utilized.24
At the time of the Impact Assessment (IA), it was recognized that 25 out of
the 29 countries (EU, Turkey and Norway) surveyed had a national register, which
contained the data on the origin and destination of the organs. 25 Only eight countries

means of comparing best practices; Translating these European guidelines in
to national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting
measures, taking into account national and regional differences; Periodic
monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning
processes.
20

Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standards of
Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for Transplantation and the
Communication from the Commission Action Plan on Organ Donation and
Transplantation (2009-2015): Strengthened Cooperation Between Member
States, SEC (2008) 2956.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 3.

23

See Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 14.

24

Id.
See European Commission, supra note 4.

25
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made reporting adverse conditions compulsory. Once a disease is found in the
recipient, there is an urgent need to trace the donor to prevent the disease. However,
there was no system that would allow the tracing in cross-border cases, despite more
than 4000 organs being exchanged between Member States annually.26 Organs will
inevitably be related to cells and tissues. It is therefore vital that information about
adverse effects and infections in a solid organ transplant can be quickly traced to a
donor and immediately relayed to the tissue vigilance system, which is foreseen by
the European tissue and cell directive. 27
In the IA, DG Sanco identified four regulatory approaches in the area of
organ donation and transplantation, which were devised through experimental
methods.28 The first option involved the EU Commission continuing to take actions
such as its previous involvement in research programs and international
cooperation.29 The second option involved a non-regulatory approach by developing
a European Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation for the period 20092015. The third option involved the combination of an Action Plan, similarly to
option 2, along with a ‘flexible directive.’ The fourth option involved the
combination of an Action Plan with a stringent directive. This directive will be
modelled on the Tissue and Cells Directive and thus contain detailed regulation
about safety and quality of care needed to be enforced within the Member States. 30
These options were assessed via a number of methods.31 The first point of
analysis of impact was a literature review. Secondly, country studies were reviewed
in relation to six sample countries. Thirdly, interviews taken of stakeholders were
conducted including with national and general experts in the field of organ donation.
Fourthly, in order to examine the improvements four scenarios of different changes
in living and deceased donation rates were developed, which were used to identify
the economic and health impacts of the proposals. Fifthly, a cost consequence
framework in the form of an impact matrix was used to analyse the evidence,
identify the key impacts and compare them across the four options. 32
All policy options were likely to increase donation rates. According to the
IA, the best scenario would see approximately 21,000 organ transplantation
operations per year saving 230,000 lives.33 The IA suggested that options 2 and 4

26

Id.

27

See European Commission, supra note 16 at 15.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 3.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 4.

32

See European Commission, supra note 4 at 5.
Id. at 4.

33
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could lead to better economic benefits. However, the Member States needed to
invest to improve the national infrastructure in this field. The evidence shows that
organ transplantation allows patients to participate in social and working life. Option
3 was considered the best option to reconcile the objectives with the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality. A flexible Directive combined with an Action Plan
would allow the decision-making process to be distributed, thereby including actors
at the hospitals, EU Member States and European levels.
Different scenarios were used to establish the likely results that could be
achieved from the different policy options. The reasoning is as follows: 34
Proposals usually depend on national transplant systems. There is often a lack of
clarity between policy outcome and actual impacts.
The multilevel governance approach in organ transplantation creates uncertainty
in outcomes. The improvements to organ transplantation procedures are delivered in
hospitals. As option 2 and 3 allow voluntary action, it is questionable how much of
the European procedures would enter hospital systems.
The Spanish model was used as a comparator to assess potential impacts. It is the
best example to illustrate that organ donation and procurement can increase and
sustain organ donation rates.
The results of this comparison showed that option 3 and option 4 contained the
most elements for success of the Spanish model.
The Spanish comparator was used as to produce the ideal results. The
assumption was that if the Member States were to fully implement the European
options then they achieve the Spanish results.
The IA realized that these were optimistic results, therefore three other scenarios
were utilized: All countries achieve at least European average transplantation rate;
all countries improve transplantation rate by 10%; and all countries improve
transplantation rate by 30%.35

34

35

Id.

See Commission Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a
Directive on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for
Transplantation and Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation,
supra note 16 at 60.
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Table 1 below will show that the policy options need to adhere to the
commitment/capacity that the EU Member States are willing to submit to.
Table 1

Scenario and policy options.36

Element

Option 1

Option 2
Action
Plan (AP)

Low
commitment/capacity
Member States

No change

No
increase

High
commitment/capacity
of Member States

No change

High
increase
scenarios
1 and 3

Option 3
AP
and
Flexible
Directive
Average
increase
scenarios
2 and 4
High
increase
scenarios
1 and 3

Option 4
AP
and
Stringent
Directive
Average
increase
scenarios
2
and 4
High increase
scenarios
1
and 3

Options 3 and 4 make compulsory changes. Thus, the results are more visible
than in option 2. If the options had been compared with the Spanish model, then
there would be no increase in organ donation rates under option 1. Option 2 would
lead to an increase if EU Member States were willing to implement the Action Plans.
However, if there is no commitment from an EU Member State then not much can
be expected in relation to results. The results under options 3 and 4 are more positive
as they enforce mandatory national implementation. The problem with option 4 is
that with the stringent directive in place it may make organisations become reluctant
to participate in organ procurement and result in reduced organ donation rates.
If the policy options are benchmarked against the Spanish model, then it
can be seen that all options would promote the role of transplant donor coordinators
(TDCs) in hospitals. They promote public awareness by improving the knowledge of
health professionals and patient groups. Options 3 and 4 demand legal mandates, the
establishment of programs and systems and training. The problems remain with the
implementation as the Member States have a lower discretion within options 3 and 4.

Table 2 below outlines the options in accordance with their health, social and EU
impact budgets.37
36

Id. at 63.
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Option
Option 1
No change

Health impacts
No change
expected to
address the current
shortage in organ
donations.

Social Impacts
- No change in
Quality of
life and
social
participation
/employment
of
donor/recipi
ents
- Varied trust and
confidence
in the
transplant
system
across
Member
States.

37

Id. at 71-3.

EU Budgetary impacts
- -No extra costs
involved in
setting up
national
infrastructures
/registers or
traceability
systems.
- –High long term
treatment
costs and loss
of
productivity
due to
increased
waiting times.
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Option 2
AP

Donation rate:
From 0-7,90821,006 organs
expected
depending on the
commitment of the
Member State.
-Lower
predictions show
no change, higher
show 231,006 life
years saved.
-Knowledge
will increase living
donors.
-Definite
benefits to small
Member States due
to improved
processes and
removal of
barriers.

Option 3
Flexible
Directive and
AP

-Improved care for
donors/higher number
of transplantation
therefore better quality
of care.
-Does not address
obstacles to social
participation and
employment for
individuals. There
would be some
increase in social
participation due to the
increase in
transplanted organs.
-Public awareness
and better training of
transplant coordinators
might increase
confidence of donor
families.

-Donor rate:
medium to high.
Between 54,320231,006 life years
saved in the upper
range.

-Legally prescribed,
better access to care
for living donors

-Common quality
and safety
standards would
supplement the AP
and increase organ
donation.

-Better training plus
quality and safety
standards may increase
patient safety and
empower patients.

-Social participation
and employment:
Same as option2.

(Vol. 31:1)

-Low to medium
costs for voluntary
measures to designate
accredit establishments
and more transplant
coordinators.
-Saving costs
through standardized
reporting of medical
information.
-Low costs for
reporting requirements
under the OMC.
-Savings in
treatment costs if
Member States commit
properly then up to 1.2
billion Euros.
-Productivity
Impact:
2.4 billion if
Member State
commitment is low.
-Economic impact
on living donor:
Reduced economic
risks to health care.
- Medium costs for
running national quality
systems.
Very low costs to
setting competent
authorities.
Low to medium costs
for designating or
authorising
establishments.
-Low/medium costs for
adapting national
traceability and adverse
reporting systems.
-Low costs of reporting
of activities at
transplantation centres.
-Treatment of costs:
Savings of 1.2 billion
Euros at the best.
-Productivity:
882 billion Euros as a
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result of modest
increase in donations.
-Economic Impacts on
living donor:
Same as option 2

Option 4
Stringent
Directive and
AP

-Donor rate:
Medium to high
Same results as
option 3 for life
years saved.
-Living Donors:
Same as option3
-Cross Border
exchange:
Same as option 3.

-Quality of care:
Same as option3.
-Social participation
and employment:
Same as option 2.
-Trust and Confidence
in transplantation:
Same as option3.

-Medium/High costs for
national legal quality
systems - hospital level.
-Low costs for
establishing a national
register of
establishments. High
costs for introduction to
European standardized
traceability systems.
-Reporting obligations
and administrative
burden:
Same as option3.
Treatment costs:
Same as option 3
Productivity:
Same as option3.
Economic Impact:
Same as option 2.

Table 2 above illustrates that in terms of health impacts, the options will increase
donation rates. The options will increase cross border exchange of organs, which
will facilitate the health of urgent patients and the most vulnerable patients (i.e.
children/highly sensitized). There is a degree of uncertainty with the results
anticipated with option 2 because these are dependent on the discretion of the
Member State’s implementation. Options 3 and 4 present the highest health benefits.
In terms of social impacts, the table above also points out that the patients
will have improved social lives with transplantations. European action will further
allow patient trust to grow within the systems; the highest social benefits again arise
from options 3 and 4. From a theoretical lens it can be observed that option 3 and 4
have the greatest social and health impacts as combing the Directive with the Action
Plan allowing for the integration of the new governance and traditional law
instruments. This in turn provides the maximum benefits from traditional methods
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and new governance which is termed ‘transformation’ by Trubek and Trubek, who
state that ‘the introduction of new governance may be a part of the conscious design
to get the best of the old and the new, by yoking the two together in an integrated
process’.38
Looking at the situation from an economic perspective, options 2 and 4
could potentially process the greatest economic benefits. Member States need to
invest in the national infrastructure of organ donation to realise these gains. Option 3
involves costs, attached to it, as it requires a national vigilance system with national
registers. However, as this would be mandatory it would save costs. The same is true
for option 4, yet this option carries higher implementation costs; Member States
have less choice to revise their existing national systems.
In option 2 the adoption of the Action Plan will be based on the cooperation
of the EU Member States through the national action plans. The Public Health
Programme retains the resources with the responsibility to coordinate in this field.
Option 4 entails the adoption of the stringent directive, which will be modelled under
the Tissue Directive. This will require further detailed meetings and even more
comitology meetings resulting in further costs to the start-up procedure. It is argued
that the Commission could reduce costs incurred by the EU Member States utilise
the existing work by the Council of Europe to avoid the duplicating research by
experts especially in areas of data sharing, as better use should be made of the
“epistemic community” of experts that are present within the area of organ
research.39
III. ACTION PLAN (2009-2015) AND ORGANS DIRECTIVE.40
This section aims to provide an outline of the contents of the Action Plan and the
directive.
3.1 The Action Plan
As discussed above, the Commission published a further Communication in 2008
along with the proposed directive. The Communication contained the revised Action
Plan. 41 The Plan is designed to cover the work program in the field of organ
transplantation in 2009-2015.42 Ten priorities were identified to address the current
38

D. Trubek, and L. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation Narrowing the Gap: Law and
New Approaches in the EU, Columbia Journal of European Law 13 (20062007).
39
P. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic, Communities and International Policy
Coordination. International Organization 46 (1), (1992).
40

Id.

41

See Strengthened Cooperation between Member States, supra note 16.

42

Id.
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problem to enhance the quality and safety of organs, as well as the efficiency and
accessibility of organ transplantations. 43 The OMC was used to set the plan to
identify common objectives; set targets/indicators/benchmarking and Member States
would have the independence to achieve the outlined objectives.
The following table will summarise the strategies under the 10 priorities:
Priority.
P1

P2

P3
P4
P5
P6-9

P10

43
44

45

Id.
Id at 3.
Id at 5-9.

Strategies under the priority.
Priorities 1-5 deal with organ
availability.
The ultimate aim is to increase organ
procurement from deceased donors.
Appointment of transplant donor coordinators like the Spanish system. To
ensure uniformity in training these coordinators work will be done by following
international standards.44
Development of agreed indicators and
best practices for quality improvement
programs at national level. Specialists in
intensive care and the transplant coordinators will do this.45
Enhancing living donation especially
for kidneys.
Increasing public awareness (through
media) in relation to organ donation.
Develop mechanisms to facilitate the
identification of cross border donors.
An organisational model needs to be
developed to enhance organ procurement.
The Spanish Model the model will be
followed. This will involve setting up a
central
coordinating
administrative
agency, a transplant network that will
operate nationally/regionally, promotion
campaigns and audits on organ
transplantation.
Promotion of cross border exchange of
organs.
Promote common accreditation system
for transplant/organ donation.
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The 2007 EU Commission Communication recognized that organ donation and
the transplantation regulatory framework would need to be flexible, but would
provide a basic quality and safety framework. 46 It would follow a similar format to
the Blood and Tissues Directive taking in account the specific issues in organ
donation and transplantation. As mentioned before, concerns were expressed that if
the Directive were too rigid, then it would create too many administrative burdens at
national levels and create obstacles.
The Organs Directive was adopted, and the EU Member States transposed it
into national laws for 27 August 2012.47 The Directive is divided into chapters
containing:
- Subject matter, scope and definition;
- Quality and safety standards for organs;
- Donor and recipient protection for donor selection and evaluation;
- Obligations of competent authorities and exchange of information;
- Organ exchange with third countries and European organ exchange
organisations;
- General and final provisions.
The key provisions of the Directive allow the EU Member States to establish a
framework which would include procedures for identifying the donor, the consent of
the donor (or family consent), set a system for traceability of organs, reporting
mechanism for serious adverse events and reactions.48
The procedure of organ exchange between EU Member States requires a
system to ensure that the traceability, quality and safety conditions are met including
the safety of potential recipients.49 This system was put in place for the protection of
donors and donees alike. 50 Farrell comments that the legally binding part of the
Directive does not further ‘elaborate’ on the allocation criteria. 51 In paragraph 20 of
the Recital it is verified that the allocation of organs should be based on scientific,
non-discriminatory and transparent criteria.52 The Commission, in the
implementation of the Action Plan, should take these sets of criteria into account.
Similarly, the Directive ensures that organ procurement takes place appropriately.
The Member States need to ensure that they can provide information on the

46

Id at 9-10.

47

See European Commission, supra note 4.
Id.

48

49
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authorization of such bodies.53 They need to ensure that suitable equipment;
materials and surgical facilities are used during procurement. 54
Chapter III of the Directive deals with the requirements with the donor
and recipient protection including donor selection and evaluation. The consent
regime at the national level will be respected and procurement will occur after the
laws have been observed.55 Member States need to ensure that organ donation is
conducted on a non-profit basis.56For living donors the assessments are required by
trained and competent professionals. Member States are required to ensure the
highest protection of living donors to secure quality and safety of organs for
transplantation.57 It is acknowledged that there is a need for further guidelines in
relation to the circumstances where living organ donation can take place, and precise
listings for the type of protection that will be provided to the living donor. Donations
can be refused on grounds of unacceptable health risks. 58
IV. IS NEW GOVERNANCE THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD IN THE ORGANS CASE?
Whether the Action Plan (which is the soft law portion of the legislation) will
achieve its aims seems questionable. At a national level, it has raised concerns that it
will increase the administrative burdens on the on national institutions in order for
them to fulfil their obligations under the Directive and Action Plan. The experts’
meeting overlooked by the Commission concluded that the ten priorities are
substantive and will require planning and evaluation overtime.59
The attraction to soft law is that it could easily become hard law. For
instance, the legal effects are created by the expectations laid down in the soft law
provisions. The soft law will then be incorporated in to hard law provisions as in this
instance the Action Plan will complement the Organs Directive. Finally, the
Commission’s role to cooperate with non-state actors at national levels produces
legal effects for soft law provisions.
One of the reasons new governance may seem attractive is because the CJEU
has also regarded the outcomes of new governance as part of the acquis
communautaire. It has been established through the CJEU’s case law that the
53
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national courts need to take recommendations into account even though they are not
binding under Article 288(5) TFEU.60 The Court has limited the EU institutions’
discretion to depart from the soft law instruments, as the institutions may be in
breach of general principles of law. 61 Klabbers further affirms that the moment soft
law is applied within judicial/non judicial circumstances; the concept collapses either
entirely or becomes hard law or no law whatsoever.62 Member States will also be
obliged to accept the soft law if they have participated in the drafting procedure of
the recommendations.63
However, new governance mechanisms rely on the input of a variety of
actors in law-making thereby enhancing the democratic legitimacy of outputs. For
instance, under Article 155 TFEU (ex Article 139 EC), an agreement concluded
between the social partners can be “implemented by the (signatories) in accordance
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour in the EU
Member States.”64 Implementation also takes place via a Council decision in which
the Council issues a Directive, which is referring to the agreement management and
labour in the EU Member States and also via a Council decision in which the
Council issues a Directive that refers to the agreement between the social partners.
Notably, EU Member States do not need to apply the agreements reached by the
social partners which are not adopted, as this represents soft law for EU Member
States.65 There is some uncertainty regarding the legal status of the agreements
informally concluded by social partners. Betten comments that they “do not have
another legal status other than that of an agreement between two parties falling
outside the scope of Community law”.66 Furthermore it can be argued that non-state
actors could assist the Commission in relation to the implementation of the soft
policy coordination instruments, in particular the OMC. The stakeholders could
monitor the national measures that are in place for the OMC enforcement. The
effectiveness of this type of supervision will be based on the conduct of the national
60
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administration. Nevertheless, the Commission does not have sufficient material
resources or legal basis to monitor the Member States in the implementation of the
OMC.67
Lobel highlights that the governance model will supersede the classic
regulatory model as the former “addresses the changes in both the goals and
capabilities of legal regulation, and avoids the central deficiencies of substantive
law.68 [It] fundamentally transforms legal control into a dynamic, reflexive and
flexible regime.” This has led to the need for change in aspirations of law and policy.
However, there is scope to improve new governance the question remains should it
be applied to the organs case?
V. HYBRID FORM OF REGULATION AND THE CASE OF THE ORGANS DIRECTIVE
As mentioned above, new governance has its limitations. Democratic
accountability is only guaranteed if the decision-making outputs of the new modes
are subject to control by elected governmental actors who are elected through
democratically legitimate policy-making procedures under a representative
government. Stakeholder democracy, which is the most frequently used under new
the modes of governance, does not allow control for the negative external effects of
functionally delimited new modes of governance. Due to the obvious deficiencies
related with soft law, EU healthcare governance could benefit from the
transformation of old and new governance, where the new governance and
traditional law are put together in an integrated system. Each form of governance
relies on the other for its success. This method views the hybrid of old and new
governance.
In the light of the discussion so far, this article contends that the Action Plan
with the Organ Directive may also be seen as hybrid governance. The Directive may
constitute hard law whilst the Action Plan would be seen as the soft law mechanism.
The hybrid package combines both the hard law and soft law instruments. Harder
instruments lend force to the softer instruments. Hybrid governance is linked to
Hervey and Trubek’s suggestion for a ‘Transformative Directive’ in the field of
cross-border healthcare.69 They suggested that both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ could be
harnessed together to develop a hybrid structure. This would ensure the benefits of
experimentalism without retreating entirely beyond the legal constraints. 70 For
67
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instance, Trubek and Hervey proposed a hybrid solution in the form of a
‘Transformative Directive’ as they justified it as “much to offer in terms of
developing and circulating solutions to the problems arising from managing
healthcare provision in the context of an internal market and Europe’s social
model”.71 The internal market needs to be taken into account (which is
predominantly treaty based) within the field of cross-border healthcare.72 Thus a
hybrid structure may seem more appropriate as it could take into account the
classical methods and new methods of governance. Sabel and Zeitlin view the
Directive to set the parameters and establish transparency and accountability via
DDP.73 The Directive creates obligations for accountability and hence allows
participation in the context of soft law.74 This allows for a new architecture of EU
governance that operates through a hybrid mixture of soft and hard law.
Moreover, Trubek and Hervey suggest that this ‘Transformative
Directive’ would comprise of two parts.75 The first part would consist of hard law,
which would take the form of a Directive. Its preamble would reflect the European
social model. It would deal with the legal provisions on cross border healthcare and
healthcare services. The second part of the ‘Transformative Directive’ would form
new governance institutions, which would create legal rules by utilising soft law
through iterative participatory processes. This would then result in a Strategy, which
would allow coordination from EU Member States and the Commission. Such a
Strategy would focus on the exchange of information, develop guidance,
participation of stakeholders and peer review, which are essentials in new
governance and are envisaged for the OMC in healthcare and long-term care.76 In the
spirit of the hybrid governance structure the Transformative Directive would
regulate the standards for the Strategy (the soft law). It would promote procedural
duties including accountability and transparency, and demanding the methods of the
strategy to be transparent. The Directive would contain requirements for the Strategy
to contain guidelines for the dealing with cross border care. 77 An example of hybrid
governance is shown in The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which
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incorporates codes of conduct to make them binding. The Directive transforms the
voluntary codes to make them binding on traders.78
There are examples of hybrid governance in environmental protection.
Notably Directive 2008/1/EC on integrated pollution prevention and control (the
IPPC directive) requires that the permit can only be obtained if environmental
obligations are complied with. 79 The obligations must be based on Best Available
Techniques (BAT). The Commission deals with the BAT exchange of information.
The Member States and stakeholders establish the BAT reference documents
(BREFs). The Commission then provides the publication of the BAT reference
documents. The BAT documents are non-binding and offer details to relevant bodies
on BAT based permit conditions. The BAT reference documents are highly
influential. The Commission, in its proposal for an IPPC Directive, noted that there
were gaps in the BAT and laid down provisions to clarify the use of BAT. In
particular Article 3 of the proposal which requires Member States to “take the
necessary measures to provide that the competent authorities ensure that installations
are operated in such a way that: a) all the appropriate preventative measures are
taken against pollution, in particular through application of the BAT,” may give the
Commission with legal authority it needs to limit national discretion in
implementation. 80
The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIA) and the Water
Framework Directive (WFD) are described as instances in which law is transformed
by its relationship with new governance.81 The EIA Directive provides tools for
evaluation and adaptation allowing regular exchange between the Commission and
the Member States.82 The Commission must issue implementation reports that
provide any proposed amendments to the EIA Directive to ensure it is utilized an
appropriate manner.83 The WFD has devised an informal governance forum in the
78
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form of the Common Implementation Strategy, which allows for the open
coordination between the Member States and the Commission in the implementation
of the Directive.84
Moreover, Velluti argues that ‘a strong hybridized system of co-regulation
could also reduce the putative weakness of new governance’ for its lack in
accountability and judicial scrutiny. 85 The problems lie in the fact that law and
constitutionalism are linked to ‘stateness’ which are not found in new governance
processes.86 The solutions seem to lie with trying to establish the use of hybridity as
effective regulatory model. Hybridity aims to develop an interconnection of the
adjudication, legislation, implementation, and enforcement stages instead of seeing
them as singular processes. The first stages could begin with trying to develop a
model of regulation, which is sensitive to the realities in the EU system. The
hybridity models would allow the EU to coexist within a multi-tiered structure but
also require the need to strike a balance to ensure economic efficiency, democracy
and accountability.
It is envisaged that the Organs Directive and Action Plan could be modelled
with this Transformation Directive. The ten priorities of the Action Plan (soft law
element) deal with benchmarking, the development of indicators and best practices.
The Directive (hard law element) covers the scope of the Directive, definitions,
procedures for consent, and quality and safety of the organs. The Directive sets out
the framework and the legal duties for the Action Plan to operate within. These
include placing the duty on the Member States to set National Quality Programs,
which will include the rules on the operating procedures and traceability of the
organs.87 The institutional requirements under the Directive are firstly, the Member
States being required to designate tasks to a competent authority, whose role will
involve ensuring that the procurement centres and transplantation centres are audited
regularly, and may suspend the centres that do not comply with the requirements of
the Directive.88 Secondly, the Directive requires the establishment of a Committee on
organ transplantation, which will provide the Commission with assistance. 89 The
procedural requirements of the Directive include the requirement for the National
quality programs to provide procedures to verify donors, or donor’s family consent
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in accordance to the national rules.90 There need to be procedures in place for the
reporting obligations to trace donors and allow for procurement and traceability. 91
Following Scott and Holder’s conceptual framework on new governance’s
outcomes, the Action Plan would operate on a three-fold basis: It would provide the
platform for production and exchange of data, secondly it would establish guidance
and thirdly it would commit to reviewing, testing and validating the current
practices.92 The exchange and production of data are essential in the new
governance procedure because without the data there are no grounds for testing the
national practices.
Similarly to the Environmental Assessment Directive, the OMC type procedures
will establish and devise benchmarks, indicators to mechanisms for reporting in
order to test and validate national procedures.93 This is visible through Priority
Action 2, which requires the Transplant Donor Coordinators (TDCs) in hospitals to
identify best practices (to increase organ availability) for deliberation among the
Member States with training being provided on all aspects of organ donations.
Priority 2 aims for the Member States to develop indicators to improve programs at
the national level. Priority 3 furthers this ambition by devising programs to promote
organ donation and creating national registers to hold data on the donors.
The role of these programs is to contribute to best practices. The
establishment of guidance would be possible through Priority Action 4, which
requires regular meetings with stakeholders, journalists, national experts and patient
support groups to devise strategies to increase organ availability. Finally, current
practices would be reviewed, tested and validated through peer-reviews. This will be
possible through the use of Priorities 6-9, which focus on identifying efficient
practices and improving national models. This is made possible through peersreviews and utilising the information from the transplant network coordinators.
Moreover, it can be argued that the DDP theory would also apply to the Organs
case as the experimentalist tools such as the indicators and benchmarks utilized in
the Action Plan will be subject to peer-reviews. Whilst the network coordination
between the TDCs, various support groups, and the committees operating both
nationally and on an EU level all demonstrate direct deliberation.
Yet, the problem with the Action Plan is that it seems overly ambitious in its
scope and coverage. Thus, it seems questionable whether or not it will be achieved.
The same national bodies that are working on the priorities of the Action Plan will
be responsible for implementation of the Directive. They face additional burdens to
meet the requirements under the Directive and Action Plan. The substantive aspects
of the Action Plan require detailed planning for the implementation and evaluation.
There are the concerns raised by the national representatives on how the OMC will
be utilized under the work programs of the Action Plan.
90
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The Commission has preferred the use of the OMC for the development of the
expert consensus on indicators and best practices.94 Again, the fear is that it may
result in negotiations between technocratic elites and there needs be an assurance
that patient interests are adequately represented. There needs to be peer-reviewing of
the indicators and best practices by all sections of society to ensure dynamic
accountability. Also, the hybrid Organs Directive and the Action Plan package may
have the opportunity to uphold certain constitutional and substantive values.
Regarding procedural values, transparency could be achieved if the operating
procedures of the National programs are visible; if the minutes and audits of the
Transplantation Centers are available and if the reports and registers are accessible.95
Participation would be required from the necessary stakeholders compromising the
necessary patient rights groups, and healthcare professionals. In relation to
substantive principles, all the actors involved the process would be required to
respect principles such as equality, and solidarity. 96
One of the issues regarding accountability would be to determine the
mechanisms for the actors involved. Accountability needs to be ensured by external
bodies, which would give judgements.97 The best option would be peer-reviews in
order to review the decisions taken through dynamic accountability. Another
objection, as Smisman states is the fact that participation does not imply that all
stakeholders are involved, risking it a semi closed network.98
It is also important to consider that the EU’s legal order seems to be about
economic order and not about social-protection policy. Scharpf argues that the OMC
is a response to constitutional imbalance between the both. 99 However, it is argued
that the Directive would balance the health interests of patients and strengthen the
94

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 168(2).

95

Directive 2010/45/EU; See European Commission, supra note 32 at
Articles 4 and 9.
96
O. Schutter and S. Deakin, Social Rights and Market Forces: Is the OMC
of employment and Social Policies the Future of Social Europe. Brussels:
Bruylant, (2005).
97

C. Harlow, R. Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multi-level
Governance. A Network Approach, European Governance Papers, Paper Bo.
C-06-02, (2006)..http://connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connexnetwork.org/eurogov/pdf/efp-connex-C-06.02 pdf, last visited April 5, 2017;
M. Bovens, Analyzing and Assessing Public Accountability - A Conceptual
Framework. European Governance Papers (2006), http://www.connexnetwork.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-01.pdf.
98

S. Smismans, New Modes of Governance and the Participatory Myth,
(2006), European Governance Papers, http://www.connexnetwork.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-06-01.pdf.
99

F. Scharpf, The ESM: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, JOURNAL

OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES (2002) 40 at 645-658.

AHMED, A LEAP TO HYBRID GOVERNANCE FOR EUROPEAN UNION
HEALTHCARE ON ORGAN DONATIONS
OMC by bringing it within the scope of the internal market. It seems likely however,
that the Directive will enhance individual rights as patients waiting for organs would
be better informed due to priority 4 which promotes greater public awareness or at
least care teams/hospitals would have the facilities to gain information.

VI. PROPOSAL OF THE INTEGRATED MODEL: A FUSION OF THE THREE GOVERNANCE
STRUCTURES
Following the discussion on hybrid governance through the Organs Directive and
Action Plan the paper proposes that the Organs Directive (Action Plan) illustrates an
‘integrated model’ of governance combining elements of the three forms of
governance structures namely the agencies, comitology and the OMC in a coherent
manner. This may be considered as a possible model for the EU’s governance
dimension reflecting the hybrid character of the Union. This is possible because the
Organs Directive is a risk regulating structure, which reflects the general
transformation of society away from danger to a risk producing structure, as the
procedures relating to organs carry risks.
Such comitology structures serve as instruments that increase reflexivity as
they institutionalise forms of mutual observations and information sharing between
Member States. Partly due to the legal framing of comitology these structures tend,
moreover to be more stable and dense compared to the OMC processes. The
committees deal with complex and technical matters. Comitology also serves to
ensure implementation. It provides EU Member States with a stake of the
implementation of EU legislation. Comitology is based on soft power and
persuasion, which in the absence of the necessary competencies and resources serve
as functional equivalents to traditional demand and control mechanisms. The
comitology machinery is aimed towards the Commission’s efforts to ensure
compliance with EU legislation thus reducing the structural deficit of the EU as
regards the implementation and compliance mechanisms.
Earlier considerations made in this article highlighted that agencies tend to
be networked; they are established in complex areas in which it is hard for the
Commission to ensure the stability of networks. Therefore, the secretarial and
networking coordination roles have been delegated to agencies that act like mini
Commissions. Their intrinsic lack of discretionary competencies, limits their role to
generating information and monitoring network coordination. The role of initiating
and developing policies has remained largely with the Commission. Networks seem
to fulfil the same function in policy areas as the agencies because the Commission
also dominates them. Networks and agencies have similar roles in the areas
dominated by the comitology as they operate to link hierarchical organisations,
Commission, agencies and the Member State administrations, thereby ensuring that
these organisations are embedded within the broader social realm.
It follows from the above discussion that governance structures can be
defined as institutional formations relying on the network form and characterized by
organisational and legal hierarchy, which act as structural couplings between
hierarchically organized organisations, increasing the reflexive capacities of the
organisations in question and thereby offsetting the structural deficits of one or more
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of those organisations. In addition, and especially in those areas where agencies have
emerged, Teubner’s distinction between networks and hybrids gains renewed
relevance.100 Whereas the OMC processes can be understood as pure networks,
which merely link organisations, especially in the more mature areas, especially
those where the agencies have emerged and are increasingly characterized by
governance structures which go beyond networks. Such hybrids combine
hierarchical models of organisation with heterarchical structures such as Comitology
and OMC instruments developing an ‘integrated model’ of governance which
includes elements from all three forms of the governance structures (namely
agencies, comitology and the OMC).
Evidently, this article seeks to demonstrate the combination of the three
modes of governance (comitology, agencies and OMC) that are integrated and
operate within the Directive. The OMC as an operational mode of governance is
visible in Priority 2. It aims to promote quality improvement programs in order to
increase organ availability and is thus required to locate best practices. In addition,
priority 6 also seeks to encourage Member States to develop and constantly improve
their national models, they will be in turn assisted through the provisions of peerreviews set by the EU together these actions emulate the OMC type processes. 101
The use of comitology as a governance structure is evident through Priorities 6-9,
which provide the scope for utilising the committee structures that would replicate
the EU type comitology structure. The Commission will be able to gain access to the
services of the expert advisory committee of the Council of Europe as it will be able
draw on the previous work of the Council of Europe including setting up a
coordination network which requires a committee like structure for the interaction of
different actors both public and private.102 In addition, Article 26 of the Directive
also requires the establishment of committee structure as it allows for the
Commission to be provided assistance from the Committee on Organ
transplantation.
The need for an administrative agency is also visible in Article 10 of the
Directive, which requires the formation of competent authorities that would process
data. It is suggested that a full functioning EU administrative agency could be
created. This agency would possess the status of a quasi-regulatory agency, which
would fall short of Majone’s ideal of fully independent agency. It would carry out
100
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technical, scientific and administrative tasks. This would require a management
board headed by an Executive Director who would be responsible for day-to-day
management. The agency would be a valuable resource to the organ’s settings as it
could retrieve information for all the national centres. The agency budget shall
consist of a subsidy from the Community budget and fees paid by the national
contact centres to register. To ensure transparency the budget of the Agency could
then be scrutinized by the EP and Council and EU on public access to documents
would apply.103 The Agency’s budget could also be available along with the audits
that are required by the Directive in this sense the emergence of the governance
structures together means that the organ policy would mutate in a hybrid that would
rely on all three forms of governance structures.
This article also asserts that such an ‘integrated model’ may also be visible
within the EFSA or EMEA, as these conglomerates exist of elements derived from
Member State administrations, the Commission, the agency secretariats, agency
committees, so called forums which serve as a basis for OMC type processes,
comitology committees and private actors. None of these structures function as the
decisional centre. In organisational terms the agency acts as the centre while
decision-making is within comitology. The continuing struggle between the EU
Member States for ownership between looms behind the comitology. Therefore,
such conglomerates cannot be considered to be intergovernmental or supranational
as they are not an extension of the Commission or the EU Member States. Rather
these structures are a third form, which tries to fit in with the old
intergovernmental/supranational paradigm.
These structures are partly based on hierarchy and partly based on
heterarchy. They operate within a framework of a semi hierarchy and can rely on
direct effect and supremacy but not on competence-competence. Rather the CJEU
relies on persuasive jurisprudence to operate. These conglomerates are characterized
by the need to combine elements of control and command with the insurance of
commitment by intentional norms, which sanctions obstructions of the
conglomerates ability to operate. The distinction between the OMC and the
comitology committee is blurred and agencies have their own personality. 104
VII.

CONCLUSION

Given the evaluation provided, this article has illuminated that the Organs
Directive105, can be viewed as an exemplar of hybrid governance used within
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healthcare. Such is an emerging trend given the EU’s Commission’s paper in
December 2008 containing its policies within the Action Plan on Organ Donation
and Transplantation (2009-2015) (the Action Plan).106 This Plan examined the need
to improve quality and safety increase organ availability and make organ
transplantations more efficient with the EU. The Plan came with the legislative
proposal, which has now been adopted. The Organs Directive, which is now legally
binding and will complement the Plan. Hence there will be a hybrid combination of
hard and soft law operating together. The Directive (the hard law component) will
deal with the organ exchange between Member States, promoting standardisation to
facilitate patient mobility, as well as ensuring the health and safety of potential of
organ recipients. It is hoped that the Plan (the soft law component) will deal with the
gaps left by the Directive (such as details on allocation of the organs). Secondly, it is
proposed within that the ‘integrated model’ may be utilized when applying the
Organs Directive. The integrated model presents a fusion of the three governance
structures the OMC, comitology and agencies. In the case of the Organs Directive it
presents a ‘hybrid within a hybrid’ model.
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